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Secret Policing
Barry Friedmant

This is a paper about secrecy and policing. It is written at a time of
intense discussion about policing in America. There is widespread
concern that policing agencies have lost the trust of the communities
they are charged to police, and that the "legitimacy" of policing is at
risk.1 Part of what is needed, no doubt, is greater transparency around
policing. 2 People do not trust those who keep secrets from them. But it
goes beyond that. For too long policing has operated aloof from the
regular workings of democracy. 3 And there cannot be democratic
engagement with policing if what those agencies do and how they do it
is kept from the people.
This is true for all policing agencies in the United States, from
those that engage in street policing at the local level to those that
conduct work nationally, and even internationally. That is because
what ought to define "policing" is what makes policing special: the
license to use force and coercion, and conduct surveillance, on the
American people. To the extent any agency is doing those things, it is a
policing agency, and what is said here is germane.
There is unquestionably a place for some secrecy in policing.
Policing agencies are different from many of their counterpart agencies
in the executive branch; some of what they do cannot be revealed
without putting policing officials, and the populace, at risk. The lack of
t Jacob D. Fuchsberg Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
This chapter is part of a book on policing and the Constitution (BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED:
POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION) (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, forthcoming 2017). I would like to
thank Alex Peacocke and Max Yoeli for excellent research assistance. This project was funded in
part by the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund.
' See generally PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 1 (2015) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT] ("Trust
between law enforcement agencies and the people they protect and serve is essential in a
democracy."); U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE & U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, DIVERSITY IN
LAW ENFORCEMENT: A LITERATURE REVIEW 2 (2015) ("Law enforcement must establish legitimacy
in the communities they serve if trusting relationships are to be established.").
2 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 ("Law enforcement agencies should also establish a
culture of transparency and accountability to build public trust and legitimacy.").
3 See infra Part II.
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transparency in policing today, however, far exceeds anything plausibly
necessary to serve these purposes.
The stage is set here, in Part I, with an instructive story of secrecy
in policing. Part II makes the case for the governance of policing by
democratic forces. Part III is a quick tour of the history of policing in
the United States, to make the point that policing's autonomy from
democratic governance is explained as much by history as by logic, and
that despite attempts to bring policing officials closer to the
communities they police, pervasive secrecy is part of what has led to a
breach of trust. Part IV discusses the proper line between transparency
and secrecy, arguing that while certain operational details of policing
must be kept secret from the public, policing policy is properly the
domain of democratic governance.

I. UNACCEPTABLE SECRECY
Freddy Martinez is a youthful Chicagoan with a degree in physics.
He works in the tech industry.4 Like many in his generation, he's
concerned about privacy, a concern that was heightened in light of the
revelations by Edward Snowden of widespread, unauthorized
government surveillance of its own citizens.5
Martinez developed a fascination with a particular device
reportedly utilized by law enforcement. The device, manufactured by
the Harris Corporation, tricks nearby cellphones into thinking it is a
cell tower, causing them to ping it.6 It collects information about those
phones, including perhaps the content of certain communications. The
device has many models and names, but is known colloquially as a
Stingray.7
Martinez suspected that the Chicago police were using the
Stingray to spy on lawful protestors, particularly at demonstrations
organized to protest what law enforcement itself was doing. 8 This
suspicion was not crazy; Stingrays had been used in Miami to track
protestors at the meetings of the proposed Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas, 9 and there was some suggestion in the media that the same
4
Telephone Interview with Freddy Martinez (Mar. 25, 2015); Telephone Interview with
Matthew Topic, Attorney, Loevy & Loevy (Mar. 13, 2015).
Topic Interview, supra note 4.
6 Sam Adler-Bell, Beware the Stingray, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Mar. 13, 2015, 10:45
AM),
http: lwww.usnews.com/opinion/articles/20 15/03/13/stingray-lets-police-spy-on-cellphonesand-they-want-to-keep-it-secret [https://perma.cc/48U3-KMK8/] (discussing how the Stingray

works and law enforcement's non-disclosure agreements).

Adler-Bell, supra note 6.
Martinez Interview, supra note 4.
John Kelly, Cellphone Data Spying: It's Not Just the NSA, USA TODAY (May 20, 2014,
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was going on in Chicago. 10 The police, however, would not concede they
had such a device."
At first Martinez's interest in the Stingray was technical. He was
curious whether the Stingray could be defeated.1 2 (Answer: yes. There
is now an Android app that serves this function.) 13
Then, a friend suggested Martinez file a Freedom of Information
request. 14 So he did. He asked the Chicago Police Department (CPD) to
turn over any documents indicating whether it had purchased
Stingrays.1 5
Although it was savvy of Martinez to request purchasing
information, as Illinois law does not favor secrecy around government
expenditures, 16 he received no answer for months.17 So he hired a
lawyer, Matt Topic. Topic had a fair amount of experience both with
FOIA requests and with cases involving police misconduct.1 8
Eventually, the CPD produced documents indicating they in fact
possessed Stingray technology.19 Initially the CPD's documents
indicated a 2008 purchase date, but it seems CPD had a Stingray as
early as 2005.20 When the documents were produced, it made the news;
10:54

AM),

http: //www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/08/cellphone-data-spying-nsa-

police/3902809/ [https://perma.cc/CH7W-S3TE/].
10 Fruzsina Eord6gh, Evidence of 'Stingray'Phone Surveillance by Police Mounts in Chicago,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR PASSCODE (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/
20 14/1222/Evidence-of-stingray-phone-surveillance-by-police-mounts-in-Chicago
[https://perma.cc/486F-L7KQ/].

" See John Dodge, After Denials, Chicago Police Department Admits Purchase of Cell-Phone
Spying Devices, CBS CHI. (Oct. 1, 2014, 10:52 AM), http:I/chicago.cbslocal.com/2014/10/01/chicago[https://perma.cc/9TSM-C9Q5/]
police-department-admits-purchase-of-cell-phone-spying-devices/
(noting CPD's earlier denials and eventual admission of ownership of Stingrays).
1

Martinez

Interview, supra note 4.

13 See Ravishankar Borgaonkar,

Understanding IMSI Privacy, BLACKHAT USA 2014
[https://perma.
https://www.isti.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/fg214/ravilDarshak-bhl4.pdf
(Aug. 7, 2014),
cc/CVJ8-978J/]; Darshak, GOOGLE PLAY, https: /play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.
darshak&hl=en [https://perma.cc/A6TX-JCC4/] (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
14 Martinez Interview, supra note 4.
15
Complaint at 4, Ex. 7, Martinez v. Chicago Police Dep't, No. 2014 CH 09565 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
June 6, 2014).
16 See ILL. CONST., art. VIII, § 1(c) ("Reports and records of the obligation, receipt and use of
public funds of the State, units of local government and school districts are public records
available for inspection by the public according to law."); Oberman v. Byrne, 445 N.E.2d 374, 380
(Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1983) ("[I1t is necessary that public disclosure be made of specific
transactions and not mere disclosure of the source of the revenue and 'broad direction' to which
expenditures went.").
17 Complaint, supra note 15, at 4-5.
Topic Interview, supra note 4; Martinez Interview, supra note 4.

Letter from Jack Enter, Police Officer, Dep't of Police, City of Chi., to Freddy Martinez
(Mar. 31, 2014), Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Ex. 1-B at 12, Martinez v. Chicago Police Dep't,
No. 2014 CH 09565 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 3, 2014).
2 CPD supplemented its initial response with another disclosure on December 8, 2014. See
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including the fact that the CPD had previously denied to the media
that it had a Stingray. 21
Martinez and Topic followed up with FOIA requests designed to
elicit basic information about the use of the Stingray. Was the CPD
getting a warrant before using it? Was it telling judges honestly what it
was doing? Was there a legal opinion on the constitutionality of using
the Stingray? Was it being used at protests? Was there a data access
and retention policy in place? 22
The CPD gave Martinez and Topic the runaround. It hired a law
firm and spent well over one hundred thousand dollars avoiding the
requests.

23

The department made a host of claims: there were no

responsive documents; if there had been they were under court seal;
and if they were not sealed, they would be confidential anyway as a
matter of trade secrets or federal national security law. 2 4 These were all
an exercise in avoiding the issue. For example, sealed documents
commonly are unsealed at a later date pursuant to a lawful request. 2 5
The supposed trade secret was the product of a public patent. 26
Chicago was not alone. Reports of Stingray use were popping up all
over the country, and they had an eerie familiarity. San Diego's police
department issued a statement saying it couldn't say anything; 27
Anaheim, California issued one that sounded oddly the same. 28 So did

Letter from Elizabeth Lopez, Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, to Freddy Martinez (Dec. 8, 2014),
Defendant's Notice of Supplemental Production in Response to FOIA Request Ex. A at 6, Martinez
v. Chicago Police Dep't, No. 2014 CH 09565 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 9, 2014).
2
Dodge, supra note 11.
22 Martinez filed four further FOIA requests with CPD seeking information
on Stingrays. See
Defendant's Notice of Supplemental Production in Response to FOIA Request at 2, Martinez v.
Chicago Police Dep't, No. 2014 CH 09565 (111. Cir. Ct. Dec. 9, 2014).
23
Invoice from Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP to City of Chicago (Feb. 26, 2015) (on file with
the author) (charging the city $120,322 to defend Martinez's suit and to respond to his further
requests).
24
See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 17-30, Martinez v. Chicago
Police Dep't, (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jul. 2, 2015) (No. 2014 CH 15338) (responding to CPD's arguments that
certain materials requested are exempt from disclosure as specialized investigative techniques,
preliminary drafts or notes, trade secrets, and a specific federal statute to suggest that the city
had met its obligation to Martinez under FOIA).
2
Plaintiff's Response at 17, supra note 24 (noting sealed documents could be unsealed in
response to FOIA request).
26 The technology is the subject of numerous patents. See, e.g., Multi-Channel Cellular
Commc'ns Intercept Sys., U.S. Patent No. 5,428,667 (filed Mar. 11, 2013); see also Plaintiff's
Response at Ex. 1-AC, 1-AD, 1-AE, 1-AF, 1-AG, 1-AH, supra note 24.
27
Cyrus Farivar, To Explain Stingrays, Local Cops Cribbed Letter Pre-Written by FBI, ARS
TECHNICA (Mar. 24, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/ 03/to-explainstingrays-local-cops-cribbed-letter-likely-pre-written-by-feds/
[https://perma.cc/W486-NS4Q/].
28

Id.
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the police department in Gwinnett County, Georgia. 29 The CPD filed an
affidavit in Martinez's case from an FBI agent named Morrison. 30
Morrison's affidavit was filed in other cases. 31
When pressed, law enforcement says it cannot discuss Stingrays. It
says that to say anything about Stingrays-even to admit to ownership
or use of the device-would be to play into the hands of "bad types."3 2
That if bad types know how the technology works, disclosure would
permit evasion. They say this would make us less safe, and so the
information must be kept within law enforcement. 33
It turned out this secrecy was orchestrated: for years the federal
government had been financing local law enforcement's acquisition of
Stingrays under a set of deeply troubling arrangements. 34 The purchase
contract with Harris Corporation demanded absolute secrecy; police
officials in recipient agencies were barred from discussing the device,
even in governmental proceedings (like legislative or court hearings). 35
To cement matters, police departments also had Memoranda of
Understanding with the FBI that included, among other provisions, a

29

Id.

o Affidavit of Bradley S. Morrison, Motion to Dismiss Ex. 5, Martinez v. Chicago Police Dep't,
No. 2014 CH 09565 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 3, 2014).
31 Matt Richtel, A Police Gadget Tracks Phones? Shhh! It's Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2015,
at Al (noting that Morrison's affidavit was also filed in other cases).

2 See id. ("Any disclosure about the technology, which tracks cellphones and is often called
StingRay, could allow criminals and terrorists to circumvent it, the F.B.I. has said in an
affidavit."); Morrison Affidavit, supra note 30, at 1 ("Disclosure of even minor details about the use
of cell site simulators may reveal more information than their apparent insignificance
suggests . . . . [D]isclosure of what appears to be innocuous information about cell site simulators

would provide adversaries with critical information about the capabilities, limitations, and
circumstances of their use . . . .").

" See Richtel, supra note 31; Morrison Affidavit, supra note 30, at 2 ("...
[T]his would
provide [adversaries with] the information necessary to develop defensive technology, modify their
behaviors, and otherwise take countermeasures . . . .").

'

See Richtel, supra note 31 (noting that the FBI and Harris Corp. coordinated the

nondisclosure

agreements centrally); Farivar,

supra note

27 (noting apparent coordination

between the FBI and local police departments in responding to enquiries concerning Stingrays);
Jessica Glenza & Nicky Woolf, Stingray Spying: FBI's Secret Deal with Police Hides Phone
Dragnet from Courts, GUARDIAN

(Apr. 10, 2015,

10:49 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-

news/2015/apr/10/stingray-spying-fbi-phone-dragnet-police
[https: Ilperma.cclU5HC-7D9K/]
(describing coordination between the FBI and law enforcement agencies in twenty states to
conceal information concerning the use of Stingray devices).
*

Harris Corporation, Harris Government Communications Systems Terms and Conditions

of Sale for Domestic Wireless Equipment, Software, and Services at 1 (June 25, 2013) (on file with
author); see also Harris Government Communications Systems Division Terms and Conditions of

Sale for Wireless Equipment, Software and Services at 1-2 (June 25, 2012), http://www.
nyclu.org/files/20150109-Appeal-Responsefrom-NYSPolice.pdf
[https:lperma.cc/S4DM-8P6H]
(requiring purchasers of equipment to keep information concerning purchase, use and technical
specifications secret).
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requirement that a prosecution be dropped if law enforcement was
forced to reveal Stingray information in court.3 6
Although the FBI said it had never insisted that a prosecution be
dismissed if Stingray information was brought before the court, this
plainly was happening. In Tallahassee, Florida, the state bargained out
a case in which the defendants had robbed someone with BB guns.37 In
St. Louis, there is evidence of the same in a case involving a robbery
and severe beating.3 8
Existing convictions were jeopardized once the use of Stingrays
became public. In Charlotte, a FOIA request revealed the police had a
Stingray since 2006.39 For four years apparently no warrant was
requested when the Stingray was used, and then for four more years
the warrant applications were not accurate about the technology being
used. 40 The prosecutor was forced to go through records of past
convictions to see if any case needed to be reopened for failing to
disclose the information. 41 The same was true in Tacoma,
Washington. 42

3

Cyrus Farivar, FBI Would Rather Prosecutors Drop Cases than Disclose Stingray Details,
5:35 PM), http: //arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/04/fbi-would-

ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 7, 2015,

rather-prosecutors-drop-cases-than-disclose-stingray-details/

[https://perma.cc/V6U7-J9Y5]; Letter

from Christopher M. Piehota, Special Agent in Charge, Buffalo Division, FBI, to Scott R. Patronik,
Chief, Erie Cty. Sheriff's Office at 3 (June 29, 2012), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/
[https://perma.ccIU2QL-ZPPJ]
1727748-non-disclosure-agreement.html#document /p3/a2 12440
(outlining requirement to seek dismissal of prosecutions involving Stingrays at the FBI's request).
" See Ellen Nakashima, Secrecy Around Police Surveillance Equipment Proves a Case's
Undoing, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
secrecy-around-police-surveillance-equipment-proves-a-cases-undoing/2015/02/22/ce72308a-b7ac-

11e4-aaO5-1ce812b3fdd2_story.htm1 [http://perma.cc/3KXJ-8AYB] (describing a plea deal reached
with a defendant to avoid questioning concerning the Stingray).

3 See Jessica Lussenhop, St. Louis Police Have Used Stingray Technology for Years-They
Just Won't Talk About It, RIVERFRONT TIMES (May 20, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.
riverfronttimes.cominewsblog/2015/05/20/st-louis-police-have-used-stingray-technology-for-yearsthey-just-wont-talk-about-it [https://perma.cc/8J4X-JVXR/] (Describing a decision by prosecutors
to drop robbery charges, supposedly because the case hinged on the use of Stingray technology.
The prosecutor denied that this was the basis for dropping the charges.).
3
Fred Clasen-Kelly, Secrecy Lifts in CMPD StingRay Phone Tracking, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER (Feb. 15, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/latest-news/article
10435436.html#.VONYcy4YEsJ [https://perma.ccff3TH-Y7SZ/].
40 See Fred Clasen-Kelly, Mecklenburg County District Attorney's Office to Review
Surveillance Cases, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER

(Nov. 20,

2014,

11:00 PM), http://www.charlotte

observer.com/news/local/crime/article9234986.html [https:I/perma.cc/97V3-N6LH] (noting that the
files disclosed "contain[ed] no records showing CMPD received court permission to use a StingRay
from when it first purchased the device in 2006 until 2010").
41
Clasen-Kelly, supra note 39.
42 Adam Lynn, Tacoma Police Change How They Seek Permission to Use Cellphone Tracker,
NEWS TRIB. (Nov. 15, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.thenewstribune.comnews/local/crime/
article25894096.html [https://perma.cc/HL6Q-DVQR/].
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Judges were getting understandably unhappy. In Baltimore, where
records show a Stingray was used over four thousand times in seven
years, a judge threatened to hold police in contempt if he was not given
a straightforward answer about Stingrays. 43 In Erie County, New York,
a judge ordered the government to respond to a FOIA request, saying of
the FBI's rule regarding dismissing prosecutions, "If that is not an
instruction that affects the public, nothing is."44 The judge in
Tallahassee asked, "What right does law enforcement have to hide
behind the rules and listen in and take people's information like the
NSA?" 45
The costs here were far deeper yet, however. Because, as Matt
Topic and Freddy Martinez would say, the people cannot govern
policing agencies if they are kept in the dark about what they are
doing. And yet it is problematic to think of policing agencies as
ungoverned.

II. DEMOCRATIC POLICING
Policing agencies are exactly that: agencies in the executive branch
of government. Yet, we govern them differently than the other agencies
of executive government. 46
Most executive branch functions are governed by rules. The rules
are public. They are in place before officials act. They are formulated
with public input. 47
This model of transparency and public participation is pervasive at
all the levels of government. It is, in a sense, fundamental to

a

Adler-Bell, supra note 6.

In re N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. Erie Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 15 N.Y.S.3d 713, at *11 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Mar. 17, 2015) (table case).
"

45

Nakashima, supra note 37 (reporting a judge's questioning of a prosecutor's argument that

&

the StingRay technology needed to remain secret and exempt from disclosure laws).
' Much of the argument that follows is developed at greater length in Barry Friedman
Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827 (2015).
47
The development of the administrative state embodies the principle that rules should be
public and transparent. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 472-73, 541-42 (2003) (describing
the function of notice and comment rulemaking); Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and
Public Deliberation:An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1635 (1985) (citing the benefits of
public rulemaking); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1686 (1971) (noting the importance of outside input from organized interests).
"Interpretive rules" are exempt from the rulemaking requirement,

but courts construe the

exemption narrowly. See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1,
6-7 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (construing a TSA policy as substantive and not interpretive); Hoctor v. U.S.
Dep't of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 169-71 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the Department of Agriculture's
characterization of a rule as interpretive). For a general discussion of these requirements, see
Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 46, at 1837-43.
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democracy.

Sometimes

rules

for

executive

officials

are

made

legislatively. 4 8 Commonly, there is a broad delegation of authority to an
executive agency, which then promulgates its own rules through
something like notice and comment rulemaking. 49 At the local level,
countless agencies, boards, and authorities similarly do things in the
open, under the instruction of "Sunshine Acts." Members of the public
can attend and offer views.5 0 In other words, transparency and public
participation are the norm.
Policing agencies have rules of course-they would say they are
awash in rules-but often those rules fail on one of these dimensions or
both. Department manuals and operating procedures sometimes are
public and sometimes not.51 In neither instance, though, are those
procedures typically formulated with public input. 52 Constitutional
decisions govern a lot of policing, but those rules most definitely are not
the product of democratic deliberation. 53
In fact, rather than being regulated by ex ante rules, policing often
is regulated after the fact. Most policing agencies operate under
extraordinarily broad delegations of authority that instruct them only

8 See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 577 (1984).
49 See supra note 47.

5

Teresa Dale Pupillo, Note, The Changing Weather Forecast: Government in the Sunshine in

the 1990s-An Analysis of State Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 1165, 1165 (1993). Laws vary
considerably from state to state, but typically apply to all agencies and governing bodies that have
"the power to regulate the conduct of others" or disburse public funds. 4 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 13:10 (3d ed., rev. vol. 2011). Although states have adopted
various exceptions to open meeting requirements, state courts typically insist that such exceptions
be "strictly construed." See, e.g., Carter v. Smith, 366 S.W.3d 414, 419 (Ky. 2012); 4 MCQUILLIN,
supra, at § 13:10 ("[C]losed-session exceptions are to be strictly construed to limit the number of
situations in which meetings will not be open to the public.").
5'

For examples of public manuals, see CHI. POLICE DEP'T, RULES and REGULATIONS OF THE

CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (Apr. 16, 2015), http: //directives.chicagopolice.org/1t20l5/
datala7a57bfO-12d7cl86-a4912-d7cl-8bl2822c2cal06c4.html
[https://perma.cclB5MY-FD8R/];
SEATTLE POLICE DEP'T, SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL,

http://www.seattle.gov/police-

manual/ [https://perma.cc/AU5K-6784] (last updated July 15, 2016); see also L.A. POLICE DEP'T,
LOS

ANGELES

POLICE

DEPARTMENT

[https://perma.cc/E558-MZXTIJ
OPERATING

PROCEDURES,

MANUAL,

http://www.lapdonline.org/lapd_manuall

(last visited Aug. 15, 2015); METRO. POLICE DEP'T, STANDARD
http: //mpdc.dc.gov/page/written-directives-standard-operating-

procedures [https://perma.cclEZ4R-D4C5/J.
52
Police forces have on very limited occasions sought public input. For example, the
Washington, D.C., police department occasionally subjects its policies to public rulemaking. See,
e.g., Metropolitan Police Department Use of Closed Circuit Television, 49 D.C. Reg. 8465 (proposed
Sept. 6, 2002). Maine also requires police departments to adopt written policies on certain police
practices and requires that agencies "certify... that attempts were made to obtain public comment
during the formulation of policies." ME. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 2803-B(1) (2007).
" See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 765-68 (2012)
(discussing the role of the Supreme Court in establishing constitutional limits on policing).
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to enforce the substantive laws.54 These delegations were made for the

most part long before many of the tools of modern-day policing were
even in place. 55 Pursuant to these delegations, policing agencies enforce
the laws as they wish. Then, when things go wrong, as they inevitably
do, there are a host of after-the-fact "remedies" that kick in. There are
Inspectors General, civilian review boards, judicial review, and court
appointed monitors.56 Indeed, today's frequent call to equip police with
body-worn cameras is yet one more attempt at after-the-fact regulation
of policing. 51
After-the-fact regulation has ex ante effects, of course, but it is
instructive what is lost when regulation of policing is primarily after
the fact. Other agencies have after-the fact-regulation, but with those
agencies, after-the-fact review is used to ascertain whether there was
compliance with rules that were in existence before the fact. Those
rules include statutory mandates and publicly promulgated
regulations,

as well as constitutional law.58 Not so with policing.

Typically, the only before-the-fact rules to which policing is held
accountable are constitutional ones. Yet, constitutional law is (and
should be) a floor not a ceiling. It does not claim as its domain the sorts
of policy judgments pervasive elsewhere in government, policy
judgments reflected in legislation and regulation. 59 If anything is
needed in the regulation of policing, which serves a vital function but
imposes huge costs, it is policy judgment.
There is some before-the-fact regulation of policing, some
legislative control, but it is notoriously difficult to get legislative bodies
to act on policing issues. 60 What have they to gain? Few powerful
54
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 533(1) (2012) (authorizing the FBI to "to detect ... crimes against the
United States."). New York City's delegation is similarly broad: the police are authorized "to

preserve the public peace, prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders, suppress riots, mobs and
insurrections, disperse unlawful or dangerous assemblages ...
[and] protect the rights of persons

and property[.]" New York City, N.Y., CHARTER § 435 (2012).
" The FBI's current, broad delegation was passed in 1966. Government Organization and
Employees Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 533, 80 Stat. 378, 616 (1966). New York City's
current delegation was enacted in 1949. N.Y.C. Local Law No. 2 (1949).
5

See SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 36-38, 135-36 (1st ed.

2005) (describing various models).
5
See, e.g., Eric L. Adams, Op-Ed., More Scrutiny, Better Policing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2015,
at A23 ("We should have body cameras at all times and release footage in all situations, provided
that such release would not compromise public safety.").
' See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8.1 (5th ed. 2010) (defining
agency adjudication); Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 46, at 1838.

5

See Harmon, supra note 53, at 776-77 (arguing that constitutional review serves as a floor,

and fails to account for competing policy interests).

' See Rachel E. Barkow, InstitutionalDesign and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 880 (2009) (noting congressional reluctance to refrain
from supporting harsh sentencing measures "because they do not want to be viewed as soft on
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constituencies benefit from the regulation of policing. At election time,
legislators run the risk of being held responsible for being soft on crime.
Moreover, secrecy compounds this problem. When policing occurs in the
shadows, as it has with regard to Stingrays, the people cannot govern it
even if they would like to do so.
Yet, two things are clear.
First, the people surely are entitled to govern policing practices
like Stingrays if they so choose. It is hard to think of a remotely
plausible argument that somehow policing practices are immune from
democratic deliberation. Congress, for example, regulates police
interception of electronic communications in the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act.6 1 Surely Stingrays are subject to similar
regulation.
Second, when the people are aware of policing practices, they often
change policy in important ways. Now that Stingrays are becoming
public, some states have adopted legislation regulating these devices.
South Carolina recently proposed banning them altogether. 62
Washington State requires warrants.6 3
Indeed, given the public furor over Stingrays, the federal
government has been forced to change its own policy. After repeated
inquiries by the ranking members of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
the Department of Justice conceded Stingray use, changed policy to
require warrants when federal agencies use them, and initiated a top to
bottom policy review. 64
Yet, even as this policy change occurs, stories are surfacing in the
media that are reminiscent of the early stages of the public uncovering
the use of Stingrays. There now is a new device, which apparently is
called a Wolfhound. 65 It does what Stingrays do, but it is cheaper. 66
Law enforcement insists they cannot discuss Wolfhounds, or it will tip
crime"); Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure,Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; or,
Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079,
1083-85 (1993) (citing examples of changes to policing methods by statute only with powerful
interest group pressure); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119
HARV. L. REV. 781, 807 (2006) (noting need for political candidates to establish "anti-crime bona
fides").
6
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2012).
62
H. 4522, 121st Leg. (S.C. 2015).
61 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.260
(2015).
6
Devlin Barrett, U.S. Will Change Stance on Secret Phone Tracking, WALL ST. J. (May 3,
2015, 7:46 PM), http: /www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-will-change-stance-on-secret-phone-tracking1430696796 [https://perma.cc/SHS5-M2EJ/].
a Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Police Snap up Cheap Cell Phone Trackers, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
19, 2015,
12:57 PM), http: //www.wsj.com/articles/police-snap-up-cheap-cellphone-trackers1439933271 [https://perma.cc/GYL2-XB8B/].
66
Id.
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off the bad guys. It insists that given how the technology works, no
warrants are needed. And so the secrecy story repeats itself with weary
familiarity.6 7
Where the Wolfhound story is headed is altogether predictable.
Eventually, the information will be forced out. Regulations will be put
in place. Policy will change.
fundamentally
governance
are
Secrecy
and
democratic
incompatible. In Compton, California, it became public that the police
department had deployed aerial surveillance cameras that could record
actions on the street all over the city.68 When asked about what it was
doing, a police department spokesperson said, "This system was kind of
kept confidential from everybody in the public. A lot of people have a
problem with the eye in the sky, the Big Brother, so to mitigate those
kinds of complaints we basically kept it pretty hush hush." 6 9 Conor
Friedersdorf, writing in the Atlantic, declared, "That attitude ought to
get a public employee summarily terminated."70 It is difficult to
imagine this sort of statement going down easily with the public if it
involved any other government agency.
It is no wonder that law enforcement is having legitimacy and
trust issues when it insists on going at it alone without public
knowledge or support. Trust is earned, not bestowed. Legitimacy in a
democracy comes from the people, not their officials.
III. THE ORIGINS OF SECRET POLICING

Secret policing is, as much as anything else, a historical artifact, of
which we have been trying to purge ourselves for a very long time. This
part explains the origins of policing's disconnect from democratic
governance, and the secrecy that it has entailed.
The Constitution says very little specifically about policing, which
is not surprising given that there were not organized police forces at

Id. ('We can't disclose any legal requirements associated with the use of this equipment,'
said . . . , a spokeswoman for the Baltimore County Police. . . . 'Doing so may disclose how we use
it, which, in turn, interferes with its public-safety purpose."').
6
G.W. Schultz & Amanda Pike, Hollywood-Style Surveillance Technology Inches Closer to
Reality, CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Apr. 11, 2014), http://cironline.org/reports/hollywood
[https://perma.cc/X6N3-RWTA/]
-style-surveillance-technology-inches-closer-reality-6228
(reporting that the L.A. County Sheriff's Department filmed the entire city from the sky and could
play back areas where crime was later reported. The technology was originally developed for the
battlefield in Afghanistan.).
6
Conor Friedersdorf, Eyes over Compton: How Police Spied on a Whole City, ATLANTIC (Apr.
21, 2014), http: /www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/04/sheriffs-deputy-compares-dronesurveillance-of-compton-to-big-brother/360954/ [https://perma.cc/VR49-5TND/].
70 Id.
61
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the time of the Framing.7 1 There was a loose-knit collection of sheriffs
and constables charged with serving court orders and arresting
malfeasants. 72 And there was the night watch, an oft-ungainly, ragtag
collection of civilians that was ridiculed at times for its incompetence. 73
Regular police forces did not become common in the United States
until the mid-nineteenth century. In 1829, London created its
Metropolitan Police Force under the guidance of Sir Robert Peel (hence,
the name "bobbies"). 74 Across the pond, urban governments followed
suit. Boston created its force in 1838, Philadelphia in 1850.75

These departments managed to be both incompetent and brutal.
Philadelphia's chief had to dismiss one-third of his force one year in for
being "worthless, drunken, and totally unfit." 76 Almost twenty-five
years later, an 1872 Philadelphia Ledger article described a certain
type of officer, "the men who upon merest whim, or the slightest show
of resistance, fly into a gust of passion, pull out their revolvers and
make a serious affray out of what might have passed off as an
unimportant incident."7 7
As many are observing publicly today, in the past police power
often was used in troubling ways against marginalized or minority
communities.78 It was used to suppress popular movements and

7'

ERIC H. MONKKONEN, CRIME, JUSTICE, HISTORY 173 (2002) ("The Constitution does not

mention them. Early city charters do not mention them either, for the simple reason that as we
know them, police had not been invented.").
72 Id. (discussing the "loosely organized constables and night's watches" that served as law
enforcement in the early republic).
7 Id. at 174 (quoting the New York Gazette of Feb. 21, 1757, describing night's watch as a
"Parcel of idle, drunken, vigilant Snorers, who never quelled any nocturnal Tumult in their lives;
(Nor as we can learn, were ever the discoverers of a fire breaking out.) but would, perhaps, be as
ready to join in a Burglary as any Thief in Christendom. A happy Set indeed, to defend the rich
and populous City against the Terrors of the Night.").
7
JAMES F. RICHARDSON, THE NEW YORK POLICE: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1901 24 (1970);
SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 53 (2d ed. 1998).
7
WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 74, at 52; ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800-1880, at 121 (1989).
7

STEINBERG, supra note 75, at 152.

Id. at 177.
See Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks at the 122nd Int'l Ass'n of
Chiefs of Police Conference (Oct. 27, 2015) ("[T]he tensions in some communities, the feeling that
law enforcement isn't always applied fairly, those sentiments don't just come out of nowhere.
There is a long history here in this country."); James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Hard Truths: Law Enforcement and Race, Address at Georgetown University
(Feb.
12,
2015),
https: /www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/hard-truths-law-enforcement-and-race
[https://perma.cc/P8J4-YPGU/] (discussing the use of law enforcement to enforce a status quo
7

78

against disfavored groups).
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demonstrations, including labor organizing.79 There were slave
patrols.8 0
But mostly urban policing was corrupt. The Lexow Commission in
New York uncovered an extraordinary degree of organized corruption
operating

under

the auspices

of Tammany

Hall.8 1 There

was a

published schedule of costs to obtain various jobs in the department. 82
Fees were raised by an ongoing and pervasive degree of graft. Police
extorted funds from legitimate and illegitimate businesses alike, often
using a shocking degree of brutality. 8 3 New York was hardly alone. 84
This was the era of "incivility, ignorance, brutality and graft." 85 So
said August Vollmer, the chief of the Berkeley, California police
department, and a leader of late nineteenth and early twentieth
century reform movements. In 1931, the Wickersham Commission said
much the same. 86 Indeed, despite the supposed rooting out of corruption
in New York by the Lexow Commission, it persisted well into the
twentieth century.8 7
The solution Progressive Era reformers arrived at was to separate
policing from popular politics. If the problem was that policing was too
much under popular control, which paved the way for corruption and
graft, then the solution was to liberate it from this control.8 8 Police
departments were made to be "autonomous" from politics. 89 Officers
"

SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM 17-18 (1977).

so David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739,.
1805-06 (2000) (describing slave patrols).
8' Clarence Lexow et al., Report of the Special Comm. Appointed to Investigate the Police Dep't
of the City of N.Y., S. Rep No. 118-65, at 18 (N.Y. 1895) [hereinafter Lexow Report];
DAVID B. WOLCOTT & TOM HEAD, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 125 (2010).
82
Lexow Report, supra note 81, at 47.
" Id. at 33-34.
*

STEINBERG, supra note 75.

8s August Vollmer & Albert Schneider, The School for Police as Planned at Berkeley, 7 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 877, 877 (1917), quoted in WALKER, CRITICAL HISTORY, supra note 79, at
71.
86

See NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN

LAW ENFORCEMENT 1-6 (1931) (noting the widespread use of brutal physical coercion known as
the "third degree" by police in criminal investigations).
87 Id. at 87 (concluding, in 1931, that prosecutors knew that some police officers were
"crooked").
' Samuel Walker, Origins of the Contemporary Criminal Justice Paradigm:The American
Bar Foundation Survey, 1953-1969, 9 JUST. Q. 47, 54 (1992) ("The Progressive Era paradigm of
the justice system posited a series of semiautonomous agencies where officials administered the
law in an impersonal, 'ministerial' fashion: that is, they did what the law required. Any exercise of
discretion was an unwarranted and probably illegal departure from an official's legal mandate.").
89 Id. at 53-54 (noting the Progressive Era theory that the influence of politics on law
enforcement was to blame and contemporaneous suggestions that professionalization would be its
cure); Roscoe Pound, Part VIII: Criminal Justice and the American City, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
CLEVELAND 578 (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922) (blaming politics as the source of
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were hired under civil service rules.9 0 Even some chiefs were civil
service appointees.
In this reformist era, the notion was that policing would be
"professionalized."9 1 Science and technology would be brought to bear,
leading to innovations like fingerprinting and the establishment of
police laboratories. 92 Rather than being close to the people, officers
would be controlled from the center. 93 The symbol of it all was the
shiny, radio-dispatched patrol car, jetting all over town in response to
calls for service. 94
It soon became clear, though, that policing had become
autonomous-but not professional.95 Not only were the forces
themselves autonomous, but individual police officers exercised an
unfathomable amount of discretion. In the 1950s, the American Bar
Foundation (ABF) began a large national study of policing.9 6 Within
weeks of starting they had to call investigators back for re-training, for
no one had anticipated what they were finding.97 The first night out in
the field in Milwaukee, the ABF investigator spent the night with onduty cops drinking in bars.98 In Detroit, the investigator saw "police
routinely breaking into buildings to obtain evidence or make arrests,"9 9
including "harassing homosexuals" and setting the "whore squad" loose
on prostitutes. 100 In Pontiac, Michigan, police officers were observed
beating and severely injuring an African American who took pictures of
them while bowling, as part of an Urban League effort "to identify
officers associated with police brutality."1 0 1 In Chicago, other

corruption in law enforcement); EGON BITTNER, ASPECTS OF POLICE WORK 362 (1990) (discussing
desire to wrest control of the police from local political bosses); HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A
FREE SOCIETY 2 (1990) (noting that Progressive Era reformers August Vollmer, Bruce Smith, and

O.W. Wilson were motivated in part by a desire to insulate the police from partisan politics).
9
WALKER, CRITICAL HISTORY, supra note 79, at 39 (describing some opposition to civil
service reforms).
91 BITTNER, supra note 89, at 5 (discussing the professionalization movement); WALKER,
CRITICAL HISTORY, supra note 79, at 75 (noting that the professionalism movement failed to
deliver a professional police force as understood in the sense of a learned profession, but rather
added more bureaucracy).
9

WALKER, CRITICAL HISTORY supra note 79, at 157, 162-63, 169.

See BITINER, supra note 89, at 362 (noting desire to centralize control).
Id. at 6-7; WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 74, at 164-67.
'
Autonomy came to be understood as not only freedom from political intervention but also
freedom from effective supervision and accountability. BITTNER, supra note 89, at 8-9.
9
Walker, Origins, supra note 88, at 50.
* Id. at 59.
* Id. at 57.
9o Id.
9
9

10

Id.

1"1

Id. at 58.
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investigators said, "[t]he general orders and special orders issued by
[the superintendent] deal hardly at all with enforcement policy. Nearly
all such policy is made by patrolmen." 102
If any proof were needed of the pervasive lack of professionalism of
policing, it was provided during the turmoil of the 1960s. Police
engaged in what an official inquiry called a "police riot" during the 1968
Democratic Convention in Chicago. 103 Following extensive urban riots,
and in the face of rising crime rates, two presidential commissions
looked closely at urban policing. 10 4 The conclusions were not pretty.
President Johnson's Crime Commission concluded that "a significant
percentage of policemen assigned to high-crime areas do treat citizens
with disrespect and, sometimes, abuse them physically."10 5 The
common complaint was what today we call "stop and frisk," but then
was termed "field interrogation."1 06
Part of the problem was that police had come to see themselves as
isolated from the rest of society, and worked to keep it so. As early as
1954, Chief William H. Parker noted that police, lacking public support,
"all too often have withdrawn into a shell of 'minorityism."' 10 7 Matters
were only worse by the time President Johnson's Crime Commission
condemned it in damning language: "Cliques can grow up that thrive
on secrecy and resist reform. Well-behaved officers become corrupted by
the mores of their environment, especially by the unspoken rule that
often prevails in such situations: an officer must not 'inform' on his
colleagues."10 8 As a result, the Commission concluded: "[L]aw
enforcement suffers. A police department with a reputation for
unfairness cannot promote justice. A police department with a
reputation for dishonesty cannot combat crime effectively." 1 0 9

102

KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 41 (1975) (Prof. Davis's study was conducted in

the 1960s).
'o' JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE
OF FORCE 81 (1993).

o'

President Johnson appointed the Kerner Committee after racial disorder in the summer of

1967. REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968). In 1965, Johnson
established his Crime Commission. See NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH ET AL., THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY v (1967) [hereinafter CHALLENGE OF CRIME].
105

CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 104, at 115.

100 Id. at 94-95 ("The other issue involves the basic police practice of stopping suspects,
detaining them for brief questioning on the street and, for the policeman's self-protection, 'frisking'
them for weapons.").
107
William H. Parker, The Police Challenge in Our Great Cities, 291 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 5, 5 (1954).

'os

CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 104, at 115.

1
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Trust-Johnson's Crime Commission concluded-was essential to
police doing their job. "Police agencies cannot preserve the public peace
and control crime unless the public participates more fully than it now
does in law enforcement," explained the Crime Commission. 110 Yet,
"[t]here is much distrust of the police, especially among boys and young
men, among the people the police most often deal with.""n
The antidote recommended by the Crime Commission would come
to be known as "community policing." 112 The police, the Commission
said, should create a community-relations "machinery," particularly in
minority communities.11 3 In particular, there should be a "citizens'
advisory committee" that is "broadly representative of the community"
to "work out solutions to problems of conflict between the police and the
community." 114
By the late 1980s, community policing was still in its infancy, but
its elements were spelled out by Lee P. Brown, Houston's police
commissioner and the first African American to serve as police chief of
a major American city. 115 In a 1989 talk at the Harvard Executive
Session on policing, Brown said that the professionalism movement's
image of police cars racing around town in response to calls was a
mistake. 116 Rather, what the police needed to do was get out of their
cars, walk patrols, and get to know the community. Police forces should
"recognize[] the merits of community involvement," and should
decentralize authority so that officers can "interact with residents on a
routine basis and keep them informed."1 1 7 Brown also advocated "power
sharing," meaning "the community is allowed to participate in the
decision-making process."11 8

110

Id. at 100.

111 Id. at 99.
112
See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 573-78 (1997) (describing the
development of community policing). The Crime Commission itself encouraged greater community
engagement with the police. See CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 104, at 102 (outlining the role
police officers should have in their communities).
113 CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 104, at 100-01.
114
Id. at 101.

115 See Lee P. Brown, Community Policing: A Practical Guide for Police Officials, PERSP.
POLICING, Sept. 1989, at 5 (articulating best practices for community policing); TOM KENNEDY,
HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 11 (2012); Todd S. Purdum, Dinkins Names Houston's Chief to Be
His Police Commissioner, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1989, at B9 (noting Chief Brown was the first black
police chief of Houston).
116
Brown, supra note 115, at 2 (describing the former policing techniques as "reactive").
17

n1

Id. at 5.
Id.
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Community policing got a big boost in 1994. Bill Clinton, in his
State of the Union address, said he would put one hundred thousand
new police officers on the streets.1 19 The Department of Justice opened
its new office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS). It
dispensed some fourteen billion dollars of funds for community policing
efforts. 12 0
The problem was that community policing soon became everything
to everyone, thus lacking in clear content-if not worse. It had its
undeniably good and important parts. One aspect involved police
interactions with the community, through things like athletic leagues
for youth. 121 Another was foot patrol in communities so that residents
and the police could get to know one another. 122 One of the more
successful aspects of community policing was "problem oriented
policing." Championed by Herman Goldstein, this involved the police
learning from residents of specific difficulties that fostered crime, and
working to fix them. 123 But community policing funds also went to
finance things like SWAT teams, which, while necessary, hardly fit the
rubric.124
Over time, community policing came to have a dark underbelly. In
a game-changing article in the March 1982 issue of The Atlantic
entitled "Broken Windows," George Kelling and James Q. Wilson
argued that disorder cannot be left alone because it breeds more
disorder. 125 "[I]f a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired,
all the rest of the windows will soon be broken." 126 Then, disorder

"' William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, 1994 State of the Union Address
(Jan. 25, 1994), http: lmillercenter.org/president/clinton/speeches/speech-3437 [https://perma.cc/
C8K6-CBYL/].
120 About,

U.S.

DEP'T

OF

JUSTICE,

COMMUNITY

ORIENTED

POLICING

SERVICES,

http: //www.cops.usdoj.gov/about [https://perma.ccN8VX-DPYZ/] (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
121 See David Thacher, Conflicting Values in Community Policing, 35 L. & Soc. REV. 765, 787
(2001) (describing police athletic leagues as an aspect of community policing).
12

CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 104, at 117.

Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach, 25 CRIME
DELINQ. 236, 243 (1979) (describing a systemic planning and analysis approach to specific
problems).
124
Matthew Harwood, One Nation Under SWAT: How America's Police Became an Occupying
&

12'

Force,

SALON

(Aug.

14,

2014,

9:28

AM),

http://www.salon.com/2014/08/14/one-nation

under swat how americas-police became-an.occupyingforce.partner/

[https://perma.cclE98X-

YC7B/] ("Still, the most startling source of police militarization is the Department of Justice, the
very agency officially dedicated to spreading the community policing model through its
Community Oriented Policing Services office."); see also Wesley G. Skogan, Why Reforms Fail, 18
POLICING & SOC. 23 (2008) (discussing management intransigence, lack of public engagement or
knowledge, resistance from unions and commanders, among other reasons, as causes of reform
failure).
125 George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1982, at 29-38.
126 Id.
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breeds fear of crime, which in turn creates an environment in which
crime can prosper-"many residents will think that crime, especially
violent crime, is on the rise, and they will modify their behavior
accordingly."1 27 While this could have been a prescription for more
problem-oriented policing, it gave birth instead to "order maintenance"
policing or "zero tolerance" policing, in which officers arrested offenders
for the most minor of violations. 128
All too often, order maintenance policing was focused in minority
communities or exercised most frequently against marginalized
individuals. Rudy Giuliani, New York City's mayor, made it a showcase
program, clamping down on turnstile jumpers and squeegee men, but
also harassing local residents with the frequent use of stop-and-frisk
practices. 129 As George Mason University's Center for Evidence-Based
Crime Policy explained, not only was there a serious debate about
whether order maintenance policing reduced crime, "there is concern
that any effectiveness of broken windows policing .. . may come at the
expense of reduced citizen satisfaction and damage to citizen
perceptions of the legitimacy of police."130
The result of aggressive policing under the rubric of order
maintenance and zero tolerance was a cascade of resentment in many
of the communities most in need of policing. 131 Although that
resentment had long been present and simmering, the country got a
full taste of it beginning in the summer of 2014, when Michael Brown
was killed by a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri. 132 What followed
were days of street protests met by highly militarized police forces,
kicking off a national debate about how policing had gone off the
rails. 133 On the heels of Ferguson came Eric Garner's death in Staten
127

id.
See

Broken
Windows
Policing, CTR.
FOR
EVIDENCE-BASED
CRIME
POLICY,
http: //cebcp. org/evidence-based-policing/what-works-in-policing /research-evidence-review/broken128

windows-policing/ [https://perma.cc/D879-XU6U/]

(last visited Jan. 11, 2015) (discussing the

evolution of problem-oriented policing into order maintenance and zero tolerance policing).
129

See Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York

City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 272 n.3, 286 (2006) (discussing
Giuliani's order maintenance policing policy in New York City).
"0

Broken Windows Policing, supra note 128.

121

See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 41, 58 (describing resentment of police in communities

targeted by police for order maintenance); Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 129, at 316 ("Our
bottom line is that there appears to be no good evidence that broken windows policing reduces
crime, nor evidence that changing the desired intermediate output of broken windows policingdisorder itself-is sufficient to affect changes in criminal behavior.").
132 John Eligon & Mitch Smith, Emergency Declared in FergusonAfter Shooting, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 11, 2015, at Al.
13
See Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks to the Press on the Ferguson
Grand Jury's Decision (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.govblog/2014/11/24/president-
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Island 34 and Walter Scott's in Charleston. 135 Soon enough, it seemed
every week brought a new incident of overly aggressive policing,
accompanied by growing street protests. Million Hoodies and Black
Lives Matter became national movements. 136
In December of 2014, President Barack Obama appointed a
national Task Force on 21st Century policing. 137 That report was telling.
The Task Force commenced its report saying that "[t]rust between law
enforcement agencies and the people they protect and serve is essential
in a democracy." 138 Yet, the Task Force found that "law enforcement
cannot build community trust if it is seen as an occupying force coming
from outside to impose control on the community." 139 It called on law
enforcement to "establish a culture of transparency and accountability
in order to build public trust and legitimacy." 14 0 "La plus ga change."
IV. THE LINE BETWEEN SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY

The difficulty is that there will never be trust and accountability
without greater law enforcement transparency. There is no doubt that
secrecy plays a necessary role in policing. But policing today holds onto
a degree of secrecy far beyond what is required. The question is where
the appropriate line between policing secrecy and transparency should
rest.

[https://perma.cc/2RCS-BW83/]
("[Wie
obama-delivers-statement-ferguson-grand-jurys-decision
need to recognize that the situation in Ferguson speaks to broader challenges that we still face as
a nation. The fact is, in too many parts of this country, a deep distrust exists between law
enforcement and communities of color."); Deep National Mistrust of Police by Minorities Exposed in
Ferguson, Missouri, CBSNEWS.COM (Aug. 19, 2014, 2:49 PM), http://www.cbsnews.comlnews/

(https://perma.cc/
ferguson-missouri-highlights-deep-national-mistrust-of-police-by-minorities/
L58U-NY5H/] (noting the long history of mistrust of police as borne out by polling and other
evidence); Marisol Bello & Yamiche Alcindor, Police in Ferguson Ignite Debate About Military
Tactics, USA TODAY (Aug. 19, 2014, 2:24 PM), http:I/www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2014/08/14/ferguson-militarized-police /14064675/ [https: lperma.cc /SQG5-WYBW/I.
134
Benjamin Mueller, At Rally, Calls for Action in Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2014,
at A21.
=" Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, Officer Is Charged with Murder of a Black Man Shot
in the Back, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2015, at Al.
13'

About the Black Lives Matter Network, BLACK LIVES MATTER, http://blacklivesmatter.com/
Who We Are, MILLION HOODIES, http://millionhoodies.

about/ [https://perma.cc/RB5R-CNQK/];

net/who-we-are/ [https:Iperma.cc/M37Y-6P4K/].
3'
Exec. Order No. 13684, 79 Fed. Reg. 76865 (Dec. 18, 2014).
13
139
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FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
id.

Id. at 12.
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Pervasive Policing Secrecy

In policing, secrecy has become a culture, as much as it is a
sometimes necessary tool. Perhaps the most troubling manifestation of
this secrecy is the "blue wall of silence" that is erected whenever
something goes wrong. 141 We saw that on full display around the killing
of Chicago resident Laquan McDonald. McDonald was shot and killed
by a Chicago police officer. Once the city finally released the video of
what had occurred, we learned there was a massive cover-up of the
events, including numerous officers giving statements plainly contrary
to what the video displayed. 142 The responding officers' written reports
described McDonald advancing towards them threateningly, while a
police dash cam video showed him walking away from the officers. 143
This is not unusual. A federal jury in Chicago fingered a similar "code
of silence" in a case involving a drunk off-duty cop who beat a woman
bartender for refusing to serve him more. 144 A news story described the
"underbelly of a police subculture": ''"the blue curtain,' an
understanding between police officers that they should cover up for
each other unconditionally and that testimony against a fellow cop
amounts to a betrayal of their bond." 145 Of course, this blue wall of
silence is hardly limited to Chicago. 146
There is a similar culture of outright lying, even under oath. It
happens so often that commentators have coined a phrase for it:
testilying. 147 A 1987 study in Chicago found seventy-six percent of
See generally SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 103, at 108-12 (describing the "code of silence"
preventing officers from informing on one another's misconduct); Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells,
The "Blue Wall of Silence" as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police
Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 250 (1998) (elaborating on the police culture of silence regarding
the misconduct of other officers).
142
See Clarence Page, Is the 'Chicago Way'a Kill-and-Cover-Up Culture?, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 29,
2015, at 23 (describing suspected cover-up in the shooting of Laquan McDonald).
14
Steve Mills et al., Laquan McDonald Police Reports Differ Dramatically from Video,
CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 5, 2015, 1:25 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/Ct-laquanmcdonald-chicago-police-reports-met-2015 1204-story.html [https://perma.cc/UDM5-ETRS/].
144
See Obrycka v. City of Chicago, 913 F. Supp. 2d 598, 600 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (denying relief
from a jury verdict finding Chicago liable for condoning a custom or practice violating the
plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity). An element of this claim included the
possibility that the jury found a police code of silence existed. See Jury Instructions at 26, Obrycka
v. City of Chicago, No. 07 C 2372, 2012 WL 11088535 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2012).
145
Chuck Goudie, Judge: Police 'Code of Silence' in Bar Beating, ABC7 CHI. (Feb. 23, 2012,
4:33 PM), http://abc7chicago.com/archive/8555746/ [https://perma.cc/MP96-YV77/J. The judge
denied a motion for summary judgment, partially on the basis that the plaintiff had presented
sufficient evidence to present a genuine question of material fact as to the existence of a police
code of silence. Obrycka v. City of Chic., No. 07-cv-2372, 2012 WL 601810, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23,
2012).
146
See generally supranote 141.
141
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officers said they frequently "bent the facts" to establish probable
cause; 148 a 1992 survey of judges and lawyers in the same city
estimated that in evidence exclusion cases, there is outright perjury by
the police twenty percent of the time. 149 It is justified on the grounds
that if cops are honest in court about what they did, bad guys will walk.
(One cop described such lying as "God's work.")15 0 New York's 1994
Mollen Commission termed police perjury "probably the most common
form of police corruption facing the criminal justice system."15 1 But this
very same sort of misrepresentation is also seen at the highest levelslike when the President lied to the country about tapping American's
overseas calls without a warrant, 152 or when the head of national
intelligence lied to Congress about bulk data collection. 153
More fundamentally, the most basic information necessary to
regulate law enforcement is not public. The Task Force on 21st Century
Policing decried the lack of data available even about the use of force. 154
How can communities be expected to trust, when they can't get the
facts on how often guns are drawn, shots fired? When plaintiffs asked a
New York court to turn over NYPD stop-and-frisk data, the
Department objected on the grounds that this would "give away
information about specific policing methods, such as location, frequency

PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP'T, CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMISSION REPORT 36 (1994)
is so common . .. that it
[hereinafter MOLLEN REPORT] ("[T]he practice of police falsification ...
has spawned its own word: 'testilying."'); see also Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury

and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1041-48 (1996) (describing the prevalence and
likely causes of police perjury).
148

Myron W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of

Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1050 (1987) ("Sixteen of twenty-one
responding officers (76 percent), moreover, agreed that the police do 'shade the facts a little (or a
lot) to establish probable cause when there may not have been probable cause in fact."').
Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor:An Exclusionary Rule in

the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 107 (1992).
MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 147, at 41.
Id. at 36.

James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 16, 2005), http: /www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy-on-callers-withoutcourts.html [https://perma.cc/6F6K-97UJ].
"3 Brian Fung, Darrell Issa: James Clapper Lied to Congress About NSA and Should Be
Fired, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2014), https:I/www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/01/
[https://perma.cc/
27/darrell-issa-james-clapper-lied-to-congress-about-nsa-and-should-be-fired/
K2Y7-4KUW/] (quoting Rep. Issa's statement that "Director Clapper continues to hold his position
despite lying to Congress under oath about the existence of bulk data collection programs in
March 2013."). Director Clapper's statement is at Current and Projected National Security Threats
to the United States Before the S. Comm. on Intelligence, 113th Cong. 66 (2013) (statement of
James R, Clapper, Director of National Intelligence).
15.4 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 21 ("Policies on use of force should also require agencies to
collect, maintain, and report data to the Federal Government.").
152
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of stops, and patterns." 156 When the ACLU conducted a study on the
use of SWAT teams nationally, over half of the policing agencies
contacted wouldn't answer. 156 A UCLA law professor reported that
when conducting an important study on the extent to which officers are
indemnified if they are held liable for misconduct-after all, how can
you develop a system of accountability if no one ever pays?-she was
startled at the refusal to provide data or describe local policies.15 7
What's happened is an inversion of what should be the ordinary
state of public affairs, in which government officials report to the
people for whom they work. Noted legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron
puts matters bluntly: "In a democracy, the accountable agents of the
people owe the people an account of what they have been doing, and a
refusal to provide this is simple insolence."1 58
In the 1960s, Kenneth Culp Davis-America's foremost scholar of
administrative governance-did an in-depth study of the Chicago Police
Department. He concluded that the top officers of the Chicago Police
Department failed to understand that "they are not the proprietors of a
private business. They work for the public. In a democratic system, the
members of the public-the electorate-are their bosses. And the
bosses have a right to know what is going on." 1 5 9
Freddy Martinez and Matt Topic would say this is a continuing
problem. And they're right.
B.

The Line Between Secrecy and Transparency

The police often say what they said about Stingrays: that they can't
answer questions because explaining things in public will allow
criminals to more skillfully evade police detection.16 0 Policing, they
explain, is like a game of cat and mouse-as the cats get smarter, the

"' Christine Hauser, Judge Tells Police Dept. to Release Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y. TIMES,
May 31, 2008, at B5.
"6

ACLU, WAR COMES HOME: THE ExCESSIVE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICAN POLICING 27-28

web(2014),
https://aclu.org/sites/default/files/field-document/usl4-warcomeshome-reportrelll.pdf [https://perma.cc/PN8M-4JQA].
117 See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 903-04 (2014)
(detailing problems the author encountered in gathering data on police settlements and
indemnification policies. Professor Schwartz received responses from only forty-four of seventy
jurisdictions queried, and only after years of pursuit).
158
Jeremy Waldron, Accountability: Fundamental to Democracy 27 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law,
Pub. Law Research Paper No. 14-13), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2410812
[https://perma.cc/JFT2-9ESK].
159
DAVIS, supra note 102, at 71-72.
'6
This argument is especially prevalent in the context of intelligence gathering. See, e.g.,
Emily Berman, Regulating Domestic Intelligence Collection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 29, 38
(2014). But it is also frequently made in the context of ordinary policing. See infra notes 162-164.
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mice adapt. The longer police are able to keep their investigative
strategies secret, the longer they can maintain the upper hand.
There's something to this, of course. But what's important is to
make sure we aren't the mice, from whom unnecessary secrets are kept.
That's why it is important to draw workable lines between secrecy and
transparency.
In truth, many claims of secrecy are just beyond comprehension. In
Ypsilanti, Michigan, the City Council asked the local police department
for its policies on issues such as forfeiture and use of force. The
department declined, stating "the safety and efficiency of the police
department" would be "severely compromised" if it did so. 16 1 Responded
council member Pete Murdoch: "If these policies are not forthcoming,
city council cannot exercise its responsibility to oversee the operations
of the city." 162
In reality, the need for secrecy is not nearly as acute as it may.
seem. This is evident from the fact that what some departments insist
they must keep secret, others willingly reveal. 163
The key distinction, the one we should be making, is between the
broad policy that governs policing, and some of its operational details.
Some operational details-both pertaining to a specific investigation
and to investigative techniques that if revealed would encourage
circumvention-are the sorts of things that ought not to be revealed.
Police should not have to announce where they hide listening devices,
or the specifics on how they conduct undercover operations. 164 But
whether those tactics are to be used at all: surely that much can and
must be made public and publicly debated without undermining law
enforcement.165

161

Tom Perkins, Ypsilanti Police Department Won't Give City Council Requested Information
14, 2015 3:31 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/ann-arbor/index.ssfl

on Policies, MLIVE (Sept.

2015/09/ypsilanti police refuses to tu.html [https://perma.cc/6KK7].
162

Maria Ponomarenko,

Policy Secrecy in Ypsilanti, POLICING PROJECT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW

(Dec. 4, 2015), https: //policingproject.org/dispatches/policy-secrecy-in-ypsilantil [https://perma.cc/
4VMB-P6L4].
163
Id. (describing Ypsilanti Police's refusal to provide policies on a range of issues on the
justification that doing so would compromise the safety and effectiveness of their officers).

&

However, many departments post extremely similar information publically on their websites,
undermining Ypsilanti's claims. See supra note 51.
164
See Lewis-Bey v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 595 F. Supp. 2d 120, 137-38 (D.D.C. 2009)
(protecting details of electronic surveillance techniques, including "timing of their use, and the
specific location where they were employed" (internal quotation marks omitted)); LaRouche v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, No. 90-2753, slip op. at 21 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2000) (allowing department to
withhold details regarding undercover investigative techniques); see also Friedman
Ponomarenko, supra note 46, at 1884-86 (further developing the distinction between secrecy of
governing law and secrecy of operational details).
16
18 U.S.C. § 2516 (defining categories of offenses for which wiretaps may be obtained).
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SWAT policies provide a good example. Obviously, it would
endanger officers and the public to reveal an "active-shooter" protocol.
But there should be no secrecy or withholding of policy regarding the
circumstances under which a SWAT team will be employed, the
training its members receive, and the munitions they employ in civilian
policing. These all are policy choices with which the public should come
to terms. 166
The same is true of Stingrays. There may be some operational
aspects that need to be kept secret. (It would be easier to have a sense
of this if the entire matter were not under wraps.) But surely the public
has the right-and the responsibility-to participate in answering
questions like whether Stingrays will be purchased and used at all,
whether they will be used to collect data on protestors, where data is
stored, by whom it is accessible, and whether and when the police need
warrants or other court orders to use them.
Indeed, all too often one suspects that secrecy covers up a
disturbing lack of established procedures. In Prince George's County,
Maryland, a SWAT team busted into the home of the Mayor of Berwyn
Heights and killed his two dogs in a raid that never should have
occurred. 167 What emerged from subsequent litigation is that the
department lacked policy on the most basic of questions like what
training members should receive or what weaponry they carry. 168
Even clearer is where the line between secrecy and transparency
should not rest. Secrecy is never appropriate on the theory that if the
people knew what the police were doing they would disagree, and stop
it. (That was the argument made by the Compton spokesperson.) 16 9 It
should never, ever be an acceptable argument that if people knew what
the police were doing, they would keep them from doing it, so the
people cannot know.
That, for what it is worth, is precisely what Matt Topic and Freddy
Martinez believe the Stingray fight is all about. Martinez scoffs at the
idea that secrecy is about tipping off the bad guys. "It is not about the
.66 See ACLU, WAR COMES HOME, supra note 156, at 27, 42 (noting lack of transparency
surrounding the use of SWAT teams, and recommending that departments operating SWAT teams
adopt internal deployment policies and require written justifications for their use).
167 Aaron C. Davis, Police Raid Berwyn Heights Mayor's Home, Kill His 2 Dogs, WASH. POST,
July 31, 2008, at Bl.
See Deposition of Edward Sagin at 63, 71, 81, 92, 117-18, Calvo v. Maryland, (Md. Cir. Ct.
168
Dec. 15, 2010) (No. CALO9-18584) (noting that there were no procedures for dealing with the dogs
on the Mayor's property, and that there were no requirements for officers to carry nonlethal
weapons). For an elaboration on the Mayor's encounter with the SWAT team, see BARRY
FRIEDMAN,

UNWARRANTED:

POLICING

WITHOUT PERMISSION

forthcoming 2017).
16
See Friedersdorf, supranote 69 and accompanying text.
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techniques, everyone knows the techniques, tapping phones, the triedand-true techniques are all public .... But they are illegitimate and
people would say no."170 Topic concurs. "It is a thin, made up
justification to keep people from debating this stuff, which may lead to
curtailing its use." "If we let people know what we are doing, people will
argue with what we are doing and then they may limit our using it and
jeopardize our national security." "But that," he says, "is just not how
we do things in a democracy."1 7 1
Time and again, when there is transparency and disclosure, policy
changes. That is what has happened around racial profiling, the use of
military equipment by the police, and policies for issuing summons
rather than arresting-to name but a few.1 72
That's how it is supposed to be in a democracy. Trust is built on
transparency. And accountability requires it.
To put a point on matters, this is true even if the decision to limit
the police would make us less safe. One can assume in all good faith
that the police have our best interests at heart. That they believe what
they are doing is necessary. They may even be right. If we change
policing policy, we may be changing it for the worse. But democracy
means we get to make these decisions ourselves, even if they are poor
ones.

1o

Martinez Interview, supra note 4.

"

Topic Interview, supra note 4.

See, e.g., Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 46, at 1854, 1886 (discussing the effect of
disclosure of stop and frisk data on public support for the policy); Kenneth Lovett, NYC Elections
2013: Exit Polls Show Bill de Blasio Swept Virtually Every Demographic over Joe Lhota, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Nov. 6, 2013, 1:46 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/election/exit-polls-showbill-de-blasio-swept-demographic-article-1.1507854 (noting support for stop and frisk reform was
central to the election of New York City Mayor de Blasio).
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